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Introduction
Private donations to public goods are subject to a free-rider problem. Following Olson (1965) , it is often argued that this problem becomes worse as group size increases. Within the traditional model of voluntary public good provision, this popular claim has been illustrated by means of an example where all households are identical and preferences are Cobb-Douglas. 1 General results, however, are not available. Although most authors suggest the existence of counterexamples, no such example has been presented so far. 2 It is thus not clear which conditions are necessary and/or su cient for the general presumption to hold. This note is meant as a rst step towards clarifying this question. It shows that the conventional claim is correct if private consumption and the public good are strictly normal and weak gross substitutes for all households. This nding is not restricted to identical individuals and does therefore generalize the previous Cobb-Douglas example not only with respect to preferences, but also with respect to asymmetric equilibria.
The model
The analysis is based on the orthodox paradigm for modelling the private supply of public goods. Following the approach o f F ries et al. (1991) , changes in the economy's size are represented by means of sequential replications of an initial economy which consists of a nite numberof individuals (households) i = 1 ::: I. They may di er with respect to preferences and endowments. The distribution of these characteristics, however, does not change if (n ; 1) replicas of each type enter the economy, such that total numberof households grows to nI.
The individuals have initial endowments ! i which can be used for either consuming x i units of a composite private commodity o r providing g i units to the public good G. The marginal rate of transformation between the two goods is assumed to be constant and is normalized to unity. Fixing the commodity prices to p G = p x = 1 , an individual of type i thus faces the budget constraint ! i ; x i ; g i = 0. The utility functions U i = U i (x i G ) are assumed to be strictly monotone, twice continuously di erentiable, and strictly quasiconcave. When maximizing these functions subject to the budget constraint, the individuals take the total quantity G ;i provided by all other households as given 3 . Following the full-income analysis of Bergstrom et al. (1986, p. 32) , the households' responses can then bewritten in the form g i = m a x f i (! i + G ;i ) ; G ;i 0g
(1) where i ( ) denote the individuals' demand functions for the public good.It is assumed that the two commodities x i and G are strictly normal for all households. This implies 0 < 0 i < 1 and ensures existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (g N 1 (n) : : : g N I (n)). 4 Let C(n) denote the set of contributing types, i.e. of those individuals who choose g N i (n) > 0 in the economy of size nI. Then the aggregate private supply can bewritten as follows:
This note is concerned with the comparison between G N (n) and a Pareto e cient provision level G (n). The quantity G (n), however, is not uniquely de ned because it may depend on the distribution of the rst-best utility levels. Since the results of this paper are based on a comparative statics analysis with respect to n, one of the rst-best allocations has to be chosen. This choice is described here by xing a vector of lump-sum taxes (transfers) i , where n( P I i=1 i ) = 0. The rst-best allocation is then de ned by means of the Lindahl equilibrium which corresponds to the endowments! i := ! i ; i . While any positive v ector (! 1 : : : ! I ) can be selected, the taxes i are assumed to remain constant if the economy's size n changes. 5 In Lindahl's model, the households pay personalized prices p i (n) for the public good and maximize utility subject to the constraint x i + p i (n)G i =! i , where p x is still normalized to unity. This leads to the demand functions G i (p i (n) ! i ) and x i (p i (n) ! i ). In equilibrium, prices then have to satisfy the restrictions n( P I i=1 p i (n)) = p G = 1 and G 1 (p 1 (n) ! 1 ) = ::: = G I (p I (n) ! I ). The quantity G (n) : = G 1 (p 1 (n) ! 1 ) = ::: = G I (p I (n) ! I ) is Pareto e cient and can thus beused for investigating the relationship between the economy's size and the households' tendencies for free riding. 3 Note that G ;i does not only encompass the donations g j of the types j 6 = i, but also the donations g i of the other (n ; 1) individuals of type i. 4 See Bergstrom et al. (1986 Bergstrom et al. ( , 1992 and, for a more general treatment, Cornes et al. (1999) . Note that uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium implies symmetry among identical individuals. Hence, the equilibrium quantities g N i (n) in an economy of size n are the same for all households of type i. 5 Since all Pareto e cient allocations can be decentralized as a Lindahl equilibrium, the analysis allows us to choose any rst-best allocation of an economy with size n. H o wever, if this choice is made, the rst-best allocation of the subsequent economy with size n + 1 is determined as well.
3 Group size and free riding Free riding leads to under-provision of the public good. This means that G (n) ; G N (n) > 0 or, equivalently, that G (n)=G N (n) > 1. Both the theoretical and experimental literature usually take the relation G (n)=G N (n) as a measure of under-provision. 6 Hence, the claim that an expansion of group size exacerbates free riding tendencies is commonly translated into the hypothesis that the function G (n)=G N (n) is monotonically increasing in n. 7 So far this hypothesis has been illustrated by means of two examples of a representative consumer economy. The rst example can be found in Cornes and Sandler (1996) . They assume quasilinear preferences U(x i G ) = x i + f (G), where f (G) is strictly concave. Hence G is neutral and G N (n) is independent of n (see McGuire, 1974) . However, if G is neutral, Nash equilibria are not unique. 8 For this reason, the present analysis rules out the extreme case of zero income e ects and assumes that both commodities are strictly normal. This assumption is satis ed by another example which can be found in La ont (1988), Mueller (1989) , and Sandler (1992) . They use Cobb-Douglas preferences U(x i G ) = x i G 1; and show that G N (n) increases in n, but at a lower rate than the e cient quantity G (n). However, the question remains whether this example illustrates just a possible outcome, or a general property of the model. In particular, it is not clear whether the assumption of symmetric equilibria is important for the result (see Sandler (1992), p. 194) . The subsequent analysis is meant as a rst step towards clarifying these questions. It shows that weak gross-substitutability o f the two commodities (i.e. the assumption @ x i ( )=@p i 0, i = 1 : : : I ) is su cient for a positive relationship between group size and the degree of free riding. Since Cobb-Douglas preferences imply @ x i ( )=@p i = 0 , this nding generalizes the earlier example both with respect to preferences and asymmetric equilibria.
Proposition: If the commodities x i and G are strictly normal and weak gross sub-stitutes for all households, then G (n + 1 ) G N (n + 1 ) > G (n) G N (n) 8 n 1:
The intuition behind this result is straightforward: if n increases, prices do not change in the Nash-equilibrium. Hence, n a ects G N (n) only through income e ects which occur because some of the entrants donate to the public good. In rst best, however, a change of n leads to a variation of the implicit (Lindahl-) prices imposed on the households. The relation between n and G (n) is thus determined via price e ects on the households' demand for the public good. As long as the two commodities are normal and gross substitutes, these price e ects dominate the income e ects. Therefore, G (n)=G N (n) has to increase monotonically in n.
The proof of the proposition is immediate from the following two lemmas which con rm the intuition given above. The rst lemma shows that the normality assumption restricts the income e ect underlying the relationship between n and G N (n) i n such a w ay that G N (n) g r o ws a t a l o wer rate than n.
Lemma 1: If the commodities x i and G are strictly normal for all households, then G N (n + 1 ) G N (n) < n + 1 n 8 n 1:
Proof: The proof proceeds in two steps. First, it is shown that an increase of the aggregate supply G N corresponds to a decrease of the individual donations g N i . This preliminary nding is then used to prove the result. Consider a contributing household of type i 2 C(n). Because of g i = i (! i + G ;i ) ; G ;i and G ;i = G ; g i , we have G = i (! i + G ; g i ). Total di erentiation of this relationship gives
where the inequality follows the assumption that x i and G are strictly normal commodities. (For a similar nding with respect to weak normality o f x i , see Lemma 2 of Fries et al. (1991) .) Now assume that the claim is not correct, which means G N (n + 1 ) n + 1 n G N (n):
This implies G N (n+ 1 ) > G N (n). Because of equation (2), we t h us have g N i (n+ 1 ) < g N i (n) for all i 2 C(n) and g N i (n + 1) = g N i (n) = 0 for all i 6 2 C(n). Hence, C(n + 1 ) C(n) a n d G N (n + 1 ) = ( n + 1 )
Since the expression on the right hand side of the inequality is equal to (n + 1)(1=n)G N (n), this contradicts (3). While Lemma 1 speci es an upper-bound with respect to the relative change of G N (n), the following result shows that G (n) grows at least at the same rate as n as long as x i and G are weak gross substitutes. Taken together, these two ndings prove the proposition stated above.
Lemma 2: If the commodities x i and G are w e ak gross substitutes for all households, then G (n + 1 ) G (n) n + 1 n 8 n 1:
Proof: Consider an arbitrary rst-best allocation of an economy with size n. Since this allocation can be implemented by means of personalized (Lindahl-) prices p i (n) with n P I i=1 p i (n) = 1, we have G (n) = G i (p i (n) ! i ) and x i (n) = x i (p i (n) ! i ) for all i. If the economy's size grows to (n + 1 ) the sum of personalized prices stays constant, which means (n + 1 ) P I i=1 p i (n + 1 ) = n P I i=1 p i (n). Hence, there must be at least one type j 2 f 1 : : : I g of households, such that p j (n + 1 ) p j (n) n n + 1 :
This implies p j (n + 1 ) < p j (n). Since x j and G are weak gross substitutes, we thus have x j (n + 1 ) x j (n). (Note that this holds irrespective of whether the type j chooses an interior solution x j (n) > 0 or a boundary solution x j (n) = 0.) Using the household's budget constraint, this implies p j (n+ 1 ) G (n+ 1 ) p j (n)G (n). Hence, G (n + 1 ) G (n) p j (n) p j (n + 1 ) n + 1 n where the second inequality follows from (4).
Conclusion
This note shows that an expansion of group size exacerbates free riding tendencies of the groups' members if private consumption and the public good are normal and gross substitutes. This result generalizes a previous Cobb-Douglas example and points to the direction one has to look for potential counterexamples. However, the question whether such a counterexample can indeed be constructed remains unresolved.
